

The Violence of Law and Order Politics

The Case of Law Enforcement Candidates in Brazil

Lucas M. Novaes

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse*

July 25, 2018

Abstract

Candidates in the developing world often run campaign platforms that promise crime reduction, but what do these law and order candidates achieve after taking office? I argue that even if their initiatives curb criminal activity, these policies may ultimately cause a surge in homicides. Implementing an electoral regression discontinuity design in Brazil that compares municipalities with a winning law and order council candidate versus others where that type of candidate ran but ultimately lost, this paper shows that where they win, spending in public security rises. This extra spending indicates actions against crime, which turn out to be modestly effective. At the same time, however, homicides of poor, non-white men surge. These results point that electorally motivated actions against crime can have dire consequences for politically marginalized groups that are vulnerable to violence.

Early Draft. Comments are welcome.

*For excellent comments, I thank Guadalupe Tuñón and seminar participants at the 2018 European Political Science Association meeting and at IAST-Sciences Po workshop. Support through the ANR Labex IAST is gratefully acknowledged.


High levels of crime and violence in democracies of the developing world can make law and order campaign promises appealing to many voters. Although most political parties in those countries are organizationally too weak to offer credible political platforms, individual politicians may use their professional experience in dealing with public security to signal to voters some aptitude for fighting criminality. Notably, members of the police or the military can propagandize their occupations during campaigns to voters. However, there is no evidence that the election of such law and order candidates affects public security, and if it does, not necessarily all voters benefit from these policies. Are all voters safer when they elect law and order candidates?

I argue that the election of law enforcement candidates leads to action in public security policymaking, but that these changes can bring enormous costs to some segments in society. The two main components of public security, crime and violence, do not necessarily follow the same trajectory. Either because disrupting crime results in repression from agents of the state, diversion of resources, or causes competing criminal gangs to escalate turf wars, fighting crime can make homicide rates soar. This increase in violence could potentially backlash against the politician, making policies in the area electorally dangerous. However, crime reduction benefits better-off voters, while poor men who are vulnerable to violence and are politically marginalized will bear its costs.

This paper characterizes law-and-order politicians, and causally assesses the effects of their election on violence and crime. To do so, I collect electoral, political, budgetary, crime, and violence data to analyze more than six thousand elections for municipal councils in Brazil in which law enforcement candidates ran for office. Although violence and politics is widely studied, many aspects of that intersection have received insufficient attention (Moncada, 2013; Post, 2018). It is still unclear how politics affects public security, possibly because it is difficult to address issues such as reverse causation and omitted factors that may affect violence and politics at the same time. Using regression discontinuities that pit municipalities that almost had a law enforcement councilor against municipalities that elected one, this paper is one of the first attempts to measure the effects of representatives with a law-and-order agendas on public security.

Brazil is an unfortunate but ideal place to study politics and security. As is the case of many Latin American countries, the level of violence in Brazil compares to those of

Figure 1: Daily homicides in Brazil, according to gender and race. *Yearly moving average.*



areas under civil conflict (Magaloni, Franco and Melo, 2015, 25). However, violence is not uniformly distributed in the territory nor in society (Brasil, 2018). Homicides of non-white males amount to 71% of all cases.¹ In the state of Alagoas, these men endure 158.2 homicides per 100,000 non-white male population. The rate for white males in the same state is 51.07.² Figure 1 show that the increase in homicides in the last ten years in Brazil can almost entirely be attributed to the murders of non-white men, who currently die at a pace of one hundred a day, or 77.7 per 100,000 non-white men a year.

The country's political system is fertile ground to the rise of law and order candidates. The party system holds an excess of thirty parties, presenting no barrier for

¹A non-white person is one that according to the Brazilian bureaucracy has black or brown color of the skin, or are from indigenous groups.

²There are around 3,3 million *Alagoanos*, of which 67% are non-white, and 48.5% are men. By the end of 2016, 4.6 non-white men were on average being killed each day, against 0.73 white men.

military or police forces personnel who wish to seize voters' demands for security in order to get elected. The country also has a long history of law enforcement agents running for office in subnational and local levels. Although Brazilian party labels do not provide credible policy platforms to voters, some law and order candidates have found that by using ballot names that include their current or former status police or the military agents, they explicitly signal to voters their commitment to act on security issues. The case of Jair Bolsonaro, who at the time of this writing is ahead of all other eligible presidential candidates in opinion polls, makes the permissiveness and appeal of law and order platforms evident. The former army captain has joined the party in which he will run only seven months before the election, and he makes law and order his trademark platform.³ Since law and order candidates can run successful campaigns at all levels of government, and violence in Brazil is widespread, it is urgent to better understand the consequences of the election of these candidates. Given that most law and order initiatives rely in changing policing numbers and tactics, and police forces in developing countries are inefficient, ill-prepared, and often corrupt, law and order measures can backfire.

Results show that the election of law and order candidates affects public security, and that the eventual harm is substantial. The election of such candidates generates a modest reduction in crime, but on average doubles the homicide rate. Although there is no indication that homicides increase due to police killings, homicides are mostly contained among poor, non-white men, who see their rates increase a staggering 75 homicides per 100,000 non-white men inhabitants. There is no noticeable change among white men. These effects are only present in races in which candidates explicitly divulge to voters their past as law enforcement agents.

This paper contributes to the study of violence and political representation in several ways. First, in a general level, it provides evidence that issue-oriented candidates affect public policy even in places where programmatic party competition is rare. It offers evidence that is similar to what Carnes and Lupu (2015) show, only that this time it is not class but candidates' professional background that affects representation. Second, using natural experiments it demonstrates the local effect of law and order politics on outcomes that are salient to voters.⁴ Finally, the paper uncovers an

³www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/12/1943288-bolsonaro-e-recepcionado-em-manaus-por-boneco-de-12-metros.shtml

⁴Dell (2015) also uses regression discontinuities to causally assess the impact of state intervention in security. It is important to note, however, that that work analyzes a particular platform, that of president Calderón in Mexico. Here I analyze independent, and varied platforms in different districts

overlooked explanation to increased violence in developing countries, one in which the democratic process is the culprit.

Law and Order Politics in Developing Countries

The space for public policy in security in the developing countries is narrow. Politicians that wish to improve crime and violence statistics need to make crime unattractive for individuals, either by making legal activities more advantageous, or by improving the chances of catching and punishing offenders (Becker, 1968). Reducing income inequality (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002), providing higher wages and education (Gould, Weinberg and Mustard, 2002; Lochner and Moretti, 2004), and creating job opportunities (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001) can be effective as these improvements increase the opportunity costs of committing crimes, but even the most competent national politicians cannot easily control these factors. Subnational and local politicians cannot feasibly change these variables, much less in the short period of time between elections.

Policymakers can influence public security by increasing the probability of punishment for transgressors. On the one hand, punishment depends on apprehending suspects, and on another prosecuting these individuals and sentencing those that are found guilty. The limited state capacity of developing countries, however, is made evident by their judiciaries, who are often morose processing criminal cases, and do not grant due process to every citizen (Staats, Bowler and Hiskey, 2005). Since judicial reform is often a lengthy legislative process, it is not an option to most politicians, and certainly not to local politicians.⁵ In the end, the most readily available measure to tackle security on every sphere of government is improving and increasing policing efforts (Soares and Naritomi, 2010, 49).

Although some policing strategies may result in reduced criminal activity in rich countries (Braga, Papachristos and Hureau, 2014), not every effort results in less crime or less violence (Harcourt, 2009). It is even more unclear if more policing is effective in developing countries (Di Tella and Schargrotsky, 2004). This uncertainty about the effects of policing can in part be explained by the structure, resources, and organizational heritage of the police forces in these places, which in comparison to rich

and time periods.

⁵Local politicians can sometimes implement laws that reduce exposure to substances that increase the propensity to commit crimes (Biderman, De Mello and Schneider, 2010).

nations are arguably worse. Police forces in emerging democracies are often corrupt, unprepared, and violent (Hinton and Newburn, 2008; Flom and Post, 2016). The police also often lack proper oversight, and many crimes and abuses perpetrated by the police officers go unpunished (Brinks, 2007; Gonzalez, 2014). In addition, it is often the case that police forces carry practices from their past role of enforcers and torturers of authoritarian regimes (Huggins, 1991; Willis, 2015, 2014; Flom, 2018). In the end, increasing police presence can bring direct harm, especially where the police are a “source of oppression, human rights abuses and murder” (Magaloni, Franco and Melo, 2015, 4).

The deployment of resources to law enforcement agencies may also lead to violence indirectly. Even if policing brings crime statistics down, criminal markets are intricate webs of rival organizations (Gambetta, 1996), whose equilibrium can break down when increased policing and State crackdowns occur. Moreover, some criminal organizations command enough resources to frontally challenge the actions of the State. Politicians can devote public resources to train more recruits, buy armament, or gather intelligence, but the effects of disrupting illicit markets can lead to more infighting among gangs or even an increased civil conflict between organized crime and the State.

The Mexican case is exemplary in how increasing security efforts can make violence explode. After Felipe Calderón won the presidency and started a war on drug cartels, homicide rates soared. Dell (2015) analyzes the effects of that crackdown on murders by comparing municipalities whose incumbent is from the same party from the president, and thus more likely to participate in the national efforts against drug organizations, with others run by a different party. Municipal alignment resulted in 27 to 33 more homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Since crackdowns reduce the power of the gang running crime activities in a municipality, competitors will want to seize the opportunity to contest that territory. Although she finds that more people are killed by security forces in aligned municipalities, drug traffickers killing each other accounts for 85% of all deaths. Phillips (2015) makes a similar theoretical argument, arguing that state actions that remove or kill drug organization leaders open a flank on that organization that rivals may want to seize through armed conflict. Using a difference and differences and synthetic control statistical models, Calderón et al. (2015) show that such was the case in Mexico: removing cartel leadership, especially kingpins, has the unintended consequence of increasing inter- and intra-cartel violence.

Lessing (2017) raises a different source of harm that security efforts can cause in-

directly. Crackdowns on drug organizations directly affects violence as authorities use military action to try to bring down drug cartels. However, if the intensity of the crackdown is high enough, as it was the case in Mexico during the early 2010s, drug cartels may no longer be able to “hide”. Instead, they will be forced to escalate violence against the State. In addition, crackdowns may also increase “inter-turf wars”. If authorities fight crime by hunting down gang leaders, the whole crime organization may fragment after cartels and gangs lose top-down authority, generating discord among factions of the same organization, and preventing cooperation across gangs, and sometimes between crime organizations and corrupt police. When cartels are unable to coordinate the control of territories and pay off security forces, violence escalates.

Law and Order as a Political Platform

As is the case in other policy domains, politicians fighting crime with policing do not need to appeal to all voters in order to be electorally successful. Although increasing resources to fight crime may end up increasing violence, if aggressions and homicides rise only among non-constituents, pursuing such policies can still be electorally sound, or at the very least an increase in violence may be acceptable to incumbents who cannot risk appearing soft on crime. Since the the largest share of homicides is paid by politically marginalized groups, especially poor and young men. Similarly, in Latin America, poor and non-white population are the ones most likely to be exposed to murders, aggressions, and and police brutality, and although the population of young non-white men who are unemployed or part of the informal sector is large, they are often marginalized in politics (Poertner, 2018, 107). In addition, making incumbents accountable for crime and violence is notoriously difficult (Flom and Post, 2016; Marshall, 2018). Thus, even if increased violence among non-white men is a side effect of law and order politics, that may not result in political backlash.

Violence is not necessarily a cost of law and order policies, but it can be a goal in itself. If voters understand that an increase in violence is a step towards justice against a group of society likely to commit crimes, this increase in homicide can strengthen support for law and order policies, even at the expense of civil liberties. In the United States context, Lacey and Soskice (2015, 4) note that demands and eventual enactment of more punitive laws that have been particularly harsh against young African Americans is often associated with the political engagement of better-off voters, who are preoccupied with the value of their assets. Bateson (2012) documents a trend,

which is particularly strong in Latin America, where voter victimization is associated with greater support for “authoritarianism, vigilantism, and harsh policing tactics”. In a recent work, García-Ponce, Young and Zeitzoff (2018) find a similar pattern between victimization and demands for punitiveness. Moreover, violence can be used as an electoral tactic. Wilkinson (2006) argues that in India politicians have enticed violence against a minority in order to mobilize a larger group towards the politicians’ parties.

Insecurity may make law and order platforms appealing and potentially successful, but high levels of crime or a generalized sense of insecurity are not sufficient to make law and order salient during campaigns. Only under special circumstances is that parties in emerging democracies were able to implement *mano-dura* policies. According to Holland (2013), it is enhanced electoral competition from left-wing parties, and not high crime rates, that trigger the introduction of measures to combat crime from right-wing parties, measures that include the use of military forces and removal of due process (Holland, 2013, 49). Still, even if pursuing a law and order platform is electorally advantageous, and party organizations in the developing world are too weak to make party members pursue a common political platform (Levitsky et al., 2016), and make campaign pledges credible.

However, individual candidates can run law and order campaigns without the backing of strong party organizations. Weak parties open way to outsiders (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Barr, 2009), and these candidates’ experience fighting crime can become their trademark during a campaign, allowing them to seize voters’ demands for law and order politics. For example, the current president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has successfully campaigned for president promising to remove drug-traffickers from the streets as violently as he did while mayor of Davao, despite his party, and most of his country’s parties, being devoid of strong programmatic appeal.⁶

Similarly, law enforcement agents from large or small municipalities can use their professional expertise to run for elections under a clear law-and-order platform. Law enforcement candidates pursuing a security platform can immediately use their purported issue ownership of their professions to appeal to voters demanding less crime. In addition, law enforcement candidates can escape the clientelistic trap of other candidates and mobilize voters through program. However, their lack of political experi-

⁶“From Plan to Execution: The New President Keeps his most Brutal Campaign Promise.” 2016. *The Economist*. August 13. Regarding the Philippines’ weakly institutionalized parties, see Hicken and Kuhonta (2011).

ence and detachment from the political status quo can result in unpredictable actions and uncertain outcomes. Specifically, the actions of inexperienced law enforcement candidates can spiral out of control, increasing violence.

Law and Order Politics in Brazilian Municipalities

In Brazil, it is unlikely that law and order candidates directly profit from violence against marginalized groups. However, at least for Brazilian voters, voters do not have any special appreciation to poor, non-white men, and their killing will not mobilize other groups. Their political irrelevance also means that it is a group unequipped to counteract after experiencing surges in violence. They are not likely to receive political help from others. Almost 60% of the Brazilian population agree with the common saying that “a good bandit is a dead bandit” (*bandido bom é bandido morto*) (Fórum da Segurança, 2016), and a bandit in Brazil is often pictured as young, non-white, poor men (Bueno, 2014). Thus, an increase in the deaths of non-white men can actually be seen as some type of social cleansing (Scheper-Hughes, 2006). Finally, violence against non-white men is often neglected by police officers, who according to Willis (2015) have a tacit understanding that they do not need to intervene against, much less investigate homicides of those who they perceive as *bandidos*. The corollary is that a law enforcement candidate will also not neglect homicides of non-white black men.

The police in Brazil is reputed for their violent approach towards suspects, their corruption levels, and the impunity they face for transgressions. The Brazilian police is one of the most lethal police force in the world (Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima, 2014), and criminal justice investigate police killings in a much less thorough manner than those homicides committed by civilians (Magaloni, Franco and Melo, 2015; Willis, 2015; Caldeira and Holston, 1999). Brazilian police also has been noted for concentrating its abuses in poorer areas (Caldeira, 2000; Magaloni, Franco and Melo, 2015). Brazilian police also suffers from high lethality rates (Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima, 2014), and recently it has been severely challenged by the rise of well-organized gangs of criminals, such as the *Primeiro Comando da Capital*, the PCC. Originally from the state of São Paulo, the PCC has expanded operations through the Brazilian territory, dislodging rival gangs and connecting itself directly to Andean drug producers. This expansion has been violent.

The literature on crime and violence in Brazil is large, yet heavily skewed towards

large cities. There are many recent case studies about policing, crime, drug–trafficking organizations in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The former has received much attention on innovations such as the creation of pacifying outposts in *favelas* (UPPs), and the recent increase of paralegal militia presence in areas previously occupied by organized crime organizations.⁷ The latter has been studied for its success reducing homicides and the concomitant rise of the most organized prison gang in the country, which appears today to monopolize the crime market in São Paulo state. However, the cases of the two largest cities in the countries only offer partial insights to what happens in other municipalities. Although there are some exceptions, most case studies focus on state capitals, and there is not one comprehensive study of police organization in medium or small municipalities. This lack of scholarly attention to such municipalities leaves few explanations to 75% of all homicides that occur in Brazil.

Local efforts to change policing tactics are limited in scope. With the exception of the Federal Police (the equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States), Brazilian police departments are organized at the state level. Brazilian police is divided in an investigative, plainclothes branch (*polícia civil*), and uniformed police (*polícia militar*), which despite its name is under civilian control.⁸ These departments rarely coordinate across state lines or between investigative and patrolling branches (Soares and Viveiros, 2017). State authorities may dictate state-wide strategies and also coordinate resources, but decisions regarding where to police and how many policing is often taken by local police chiefs (given the amount of manpower the state authority decided to devote to a particular municipality). The municipal government can complement public security by hiring private security guards, implementing surveillance systems, and other measures. Local governments can also create “Municipal Guards”, hiring personnel that effectively have policing rights, but are locally funded.

Law enforcement candidates as council candidates

Law enforcement candidates in Brazil are unlike the average council candidate. Since there is no programmatic party competition in Brazil (Kitschelt et al., 2010), and party organizations at the local level are too weak to mobilize voters through program (Levitsky et al., 2016; Novaes, 2018), most candidates in the country, especially for

⁷Lessing (2017) describes and offers explanations for these recent developments.

⁸For a summary of the different attributions of Brazilian police branches, see Willis (2015, 13-15).

legislative seats, mobilize voters through clientelistic exchanges. Councilors hold the lowest elected office in Brazilian politics, and councilors have limited scope to influence policy. Clientelistic exchanges between councilors and voters are common during and after elections (Kerbauy, 2005; Lopez and Almeida, 2017). The councilors' staff lack professional expertise, and their legislative activity often centers on public honoring ceremonies (Silva, 2014). Councilors, however, can be important to empower mayors' agendas (Cepaluni and Mignozzetti, 2015).

Law enforcement candidates are exceptional because they promise policy platforms at the local level. First, unlike ordinary candidates they have a professional background in one of the two police forces in Brazil, or they have had a career in the armed forces. Second, they use their professional backgrounds to signal to voters that they intend to be law and order incumbents. This signaling can come in many forms, such as through discourse and proposals, but almost invariably law enforcement candidates use their *noms de guerre*, rank, or role in their institution during the campaign. That use becomes evident in electoral records because candidates must state their ballot names to the electoral authority, and this allows the separation of ordinary candidates with a law enforcement background from law enforcement candidates who explicitly propagandize their occupations.

The Data

Data comes from several sources, all openly available online, and unless noted span the years 2000 until 2016. The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) provides detailed electoral data.⁹ It includes fine-grained information about candidates, electorate, and electoral results. To classify council candidates that are running a law-and-order platform in the election, I collect all candidates whose name on the ballot includes any reference to the police or military force, such as captain, colonel, corporal, detective, lieutenant, private, and sheriff. Candidates also need to self-report their occupations.

Ideally, the variation in the number of police officers at the municipality level would give an accurate picture of public security efforts, but Brazilian authorities do not provide the number of police allocated to each municipalities. In order to measure variation in public security resources at the municipal level, I use budgetary information

⁹Electoral data is available at www.tse.jus.br, accessed 03-07-2018

provided by the National Treasury.¹⁰

The Ministry of Justice provides municipal crime data through the National System of Public Security Statistics and Criminal Justice (SINESPJC).¹¹ The ministry aggregates all crime data from different state police authorities. The dataset contains crime statistics in for four large groups of crimes: car thefts, car robberies, sexual assaults, and homicides. Unfortunately, data is only available for all municipalities from 2012, the year when a new regulation required that all state police departments need to provide such informations. For this reason, crime outcomes is measured differently than other outcomes. Instead of the difference between the period preceding and the period after the election, I compute the level of crime per capita after the election as the dependent variable. All demographic information, which includes GINI coefficients, population, population according to race, among others, come from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).¹² Municipal race composition comes from census data, and the proportions of white and non-white municipal residents are always pre-treatment statistics, i.e. for the years 2000, 2004, and 2008 are from the 2000 census, and for 2012 from 2010.

The Ministry of Health collects mortality statistics through the Brazilian System of Death Registration (SIM/Datasus).¹³ Contrary to crime data and police reports, death certificates follow national and international standards, and every death is documented. Death reports follow the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). I analyze all deaths involving aggressions, which ranges from homicides to suicide.¹⁴ From 1996 until 2016 there has been 1.9 million deaths due to aggression.

All deaths involving aggression must be investigated by coroner or by an appointed physician. The authority in charge rules on the cause of death through the medical examination of the body, and through interviews with family members, witnesses, and the police. This decision sometimes contain errors (Cerqueira, 2012). For example, the

¹⁰<https://siconfi.tesouro.gov.br>, accessed on 06-10-2018.

¹¹<http://dados.gov.br/dataset/sistema-nacional-de-estatisticas-de-seguranca-publica>, accessed on 06-10-2018.

¹²<https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/default.aspx>, accessed on 06-10-2018.

¹³<ftp.datasus.gov.br/dissemin/publicos/SIM/CID10/>, accessed 03-07-2018. Some Brazilian data sources prevent access from international IPs, but can be accessed through a Virtual Private Network that tunnels through a Brazilian server.

¹⁴I code homicides as cases with ICD-10 codes ranging between X85-99 and Y00-09; suicides: with codes X60-84; and undetermined external causes, which is when the coroner cannot determine intent, with Y10-34 codes.

ICD-10 reserves a category for deaths from the direct confrontation with law enforcement agents, and a comparison between annual reports from state police departments and SIM/Datasus shows that the number of deaths by confrontation in the latter is too low (Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima, 2014). The medical examiners are a branch of the police force (*polícia científica*), making misreporting or deliberate misclassification correlated with law enforcement agent in politics, an aspect that will further developed in the empirical section. Death records also list the victim's race.¹⁵

The unit of analysis is municipalities where at least one candidate had a ballot name denoting affiliation to a law enforcement corporation on a given electoral year. In reality, this means that the estimations include municipalities with candidates coming from one of the two branches of the police, the *polícia militar*, the patrolling and most numerous arm of the police force, and *polícia civil*, the investigative branch; or from the military. Elections without a law enforcement candidate are not part of the analysis. It is likely that elections with law enforcement candidates are different from those that do not, especially in terms of crime, but despite the relevance of understanding why these candidates may appear in some places but not in others,. The likelihood of a law enforcement candidate emerging is perhaps larger when crime and homicides are salient to voters. Hence, we should interpret results as the effect of law enforcement candidates winning office in elections where law enforcement candidates are running. This restriction is also important as it allows us to compare elections in municipalities similar in terms of conditions that encourage law enforcement individuals to run elections. Balance tests of demographic covariates between the groups of municipalities with winning and losing candidates in the Appendix confirm that group under study is similar.

In this paper, law enforcement candidates are those who unambiguously signal to voters they are law and order candidates. These candidates are those who have used a ballot name that alludes to law enforcement agencies in their campaign for the municipal council in Brazil. Since 2000, a total of 6,193 council candidates have used some sort of military or police ranking designation in their ballot names. Of these, 996 members have declared being from a military branch, and 3,126 declared being from the police force. In total, 2,071 law enforcement candidates did not declare their occupations as being either police or military agents, listing instead as retirees

¹⁵The Brazilian bureaucracy classify individuals according to skin color, not race. The classification includes five categories: white, black, brown (*pardo*), yellow, and indigenous. Nonwhite victims are those not classified as “white”. Of these, 97% are either “black” or “brown”.

and public employees, or other jobs they might have taken. However, these are not the only police officers or military officers that have run in council elections, as 9,919 have used their civilian names in the ballot, and are not counted as law enforcement candidates.

Campaign data indicate that law enforcement candidates run campaigns on law and other programs. They are less wealthy, receive less donations, and they do not rely too much on political brokers during campaigns, which signals that they do not have an extensive network of agents helping them mobilize voters. In comparison to other candidates, law enforcement candidates are outsiders, having being members of political parties for considerable shorter periods.¹⁶

Correlates of Law Enforcement Electoral Support

Although the paper does not aim to discuss when law enforcement candidates decide to run for office, it is useful to describe the municipalities where they decide to run. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows that compared to where there has not been a law enforcement candidates, municipalities that had one had almost twice as many homicides and robberies, and three times more public security spending. There is no large difference in terms of income inequality. The average population in municipalities with law enforcement candidates is much higher. Of around 190 million Brazilians in 2012, 66% lived in municipalities that had a law enforcement candidate.

But who votes for these candidates? There are no surveys at the local level in Brazil that measure support for law enforcement candidates. In order understand their electoral support I collect information every voting station (*seção eleitoral*) in municipalities that had a law enforcement candidate, and calculate the correlations between votes for law enforcement candidate and voting station demographics. I create two sets of variables: one for all voters in the station, and another for male voters only. Since young, poor men are notoriously more likely to suffer from violence (IPEA, 2018; Brasil, 2018), they are more likely to pay the consequences for law and order policies. Thus, it is plausible that there is greater variation on support for law enforcement candidates among these men and other groups of men who are not as vulnerable. Unfortunately, there is no information regarding income or race of voters, but besides gender, the electoral authority reports the number of individuals at the voting station

¹⁶An extended comparison of law enforcement candidates' campaigns and political experience and other candidates' appears in the Appendix.

within certain schooling thresholds. Schooling is strongly correlated with income in Brazil (Barbosa Filho and Pessôa, 2008), making it a suitable proxy for income. I calculate the proportion of voters in three separate groups: (i) those that are illiterate, barely literate, or who has only finished middle school (53.9%); (ii) those that attended highschool (36.9%); and those that at least attended college (9.1%).¹⁷ Furthermore, to better capture the relative variation among each voting station within the same district, I demean each variable using the municipal average:

$$Y_{si} - \widehat{Y}_i = \beta_1(HS_{si} - \widehat{HS}_i) + \beta_2(College_{si} - \widehat{College}_i) + \mu_{it}$$

where s is a voting station in municipality i , and Y_{si} is the the amount of votes law enforcement candidates received divided by the number of voters at that station.

Table 1: Relationship between support for law enforcement candidate and voters' schooling.

	Support Law Enforc. Cand.	
	All voters	Male voters
Highschool voters	0.006 (0.0003)	
College voters	0.006 (0.0003)	
Highschool voters, Men		0.006 (0.008)
College voters, Men		0.010 (0.003)
Observations	257,075	257,056

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The results uncover a positive relationship between support for law enforcement candidates and better off voters. In these models, the coefficients show the correlation between an increase of a group's proportion relative to low education voters on law

¹⁷On average, 53.9% of voters in a voting station are in the lower tier of education, 36.9% in tier (ii), and 9.1% in tier (iii).

enforcement candidate support. Voting stations with relatively more educated voters are more likely to support law enforcement candidates, especially voting stations with more men that attended college. These results are in line with the proposition that law enforcement candidates have a higher appeal among voters with better education, and in higher income strata.

The Causal Effects of Electing Law Enforcement Candidates on Public Policy Outcomes

The relationship between law enforcement candidates and crime and violence is complex. Charisma, valence, the ability to fight crime, and other unobservable candidates' attributes may help some win elections, and may also later affect how these candidates perform in office. In these cases, these omitted variables may be driving the results. In addition, despite the fact that the analysis only selects municipalities with law enforcement candidates, it is possible that competitive candidates appear only in places with high homicide rates, or where the time trend in homicides diverges from places where law enforcement candidates do not win. Hence, simply comparing municipalities with winning and losing law enforcement candidates will not provide reliable evidence about how these candidates affect homicide rates when in office.

Regression discontinuity designs are appropriate to address these endogeneity problems, as the method can produce unbiased estimates under few, testable assumptions (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014). These designs exploit the fact that treatment assignment, or in our case having a municipality with a law enforcement politician in office, occur as if randomly when margins of victory and defeat are small. In these close elections, the few votes that allowed a candidate to win could have gone to another candidate if random events, such as traffic disruptions and rainfall, had not occurred. The smaller the margin, the more likely that chance played a part in the electoral result.

Council candidates are elected through a PR system. In this settings, the “closeness” of an election is measured according to the distance between candidates within the same list (Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson, 2014). The basic model regression discontinuity model that captures the causal effect of law enforcement incumbency is the following:

$$\Delta Y_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{LawElected}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Margin}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{LawElected}_{it} * \text{Margin}_{it} + \phi_t + \mu_{it}$$

$$\forall i, t \text{ s.t. } |M_{it}| < \epsilon$$
(1)

where $\Delta Y_{i,k_{t+1}}$ is a measure of the difference between the outcome in the period after the election and the outcome in the period before the election, in municipality i . LawElected_{it} is a binary treatment indicator indicating if the law enforcement candidate won the election in t . Margin_{it} is the forcing variable, ϕ_t is the time fixed-effects, and μ_{ki_t} is an error term. $|M_{ki_t}|$, the forcing variable, and it is constructed within each party or coalition list. Margin is the absolute distance (in terms of voting share) between a losing candidate and the last winning candidate of his or her list, or the distance between a winning candidate and the most voted candidate on his or her list. Candidates from lists without a winning candidate cannot have a margin, and do not figure in the estimations. ϵ is an arbitrarily small vote margin that defines the study group for each estimation.

Estimations only include municipalities that had one law enforcement candidate within a given margin. There are several potential and important reasons why some municipalities have law enforcement candidates and others not. For example, an increase in crimes may influence public demands for law and order policies, and law enforcement candidates may step up during these events of heightened criminality. However, that is not a question this paper aims to answer. Thus, with the additional caveat that regression discontinuity designs return local average treatment effects,¹⁸ the effects should be interpreted as causal within the subgroup of municipalities that had a law enforcement candidate. Of the 5570 municipalities in Brazil, 2030 have had one law enforcement candidate at some point, and 571 had at least one elected. Additionally, there are some few municipalities that had one bare winning and one bare losing law enforcement candidates at the same election, which means that these municipalities are both in the control and treatment groups. The main estimations do not include these cases.

The dependent variable is the difference in outcomes after and before the election. For example, for homicides the dependent variable is the yearly homicide rate in the period after the elections, minus that same outcome in the period before the election.

¹⁸That is, we can only argue that the effects are causal in the proximity to the cutoff point of the running variable.

Following international standards, rates are reported as a function of one hundred thousand municipal residents. Instead of simply using levels as dependent variable, I use a *difference-in-differences* measure. Other than factors attributed to chance there should be no difference in the treatment effect if one uses differences in the outcome or levels, but the precision of estimates can vary between the two measures (Gerber and Green, 2012, 96-98). Given that homicide rates in a given period strongly correlates with their past values ($\rho = 0.80$), inserting prior knowledge about homicide levels removes serial correlation in homicides' trends at the municipality and reduces standard errors of the outcome, which is one reason to use differences instead of levels (Keele and Kelly, 2005).

For all outcomes I measure, with the exception of budget spending, the period of analysis is all years of the councilors' term, but the electoral year. For spending, the period does not include the first year of the term.¹⁹

The choice of the window of the running variable involves a trade-off between precision and bias. The design will better resemble an experimental setting in smaller windows of analysis, because in that region treatment assignment is more likely to result from idiosyncrasies. However, reduced margins also imply small study groups, and possibly large variance of estimated coefficients. Although scholars have devised methods to limit the discretion in the choice of vote margins in RDDs (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014; Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012), this paper opts to present several different windows of analysis, progressively from small to larger bandwidths, as suggested in Bueno and Tuñón (2015), and the confidence intervals for each window. This process allows a transparent visualization of point estimates for each arbitrarily chosen comparison groups, and how both confidence intervals and point estimates vary for every increment in the window of analysis. For presentation purposes, estimations at very close margins only shows point estimates, as confidence intervals are large due to the small power of the tests. When that is the case, the point estimate is never sta-

¹⁹Since elections occur in October, and the term only starts in January of the next year, an elected law enforcement candidate could already start influencing police right after her electoral victory, but before taking office. By removing the electoral year I conservatively estimate the effect of the election to only include periods where the law enforcement candidate is in office. Spending outcomes is measured differently because the last-year budget decision carries to the next. Hence, the first year of a candidate's term also includes budgetary decisions from a previous year. For this reason, I only evaluate spending from the second to the fourth year of a municipal legislature. That said, measuring outcomes using different periods does not qualitatively change results. Since re-running all tests would practically double the appendix section, these results are not shown, but are available to the interested reader.

tistically significant. The median number of votes winning council candidates receive is 475, 6% of the total valid votes for all candidates. The average margin of victory is 0.7%. Hence, close discontinuities will involve very small margins in terms of the total vote tally. Ties sometimes happen, and in such cases the electoral authority decides that the eldest candidate should have the seat. This tie-breaking rule unbalances the study group, and I avoid that by removing candidates with an absolute margin of zero votes.

The Causal Effects of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidates

Expenditures in Public Security

As a first step towards examining the role of law enforcement candidates in public policy, I analyze how municipal public policy changes when one is elected. Ideally, we would want a description of each public security project that would tell if the law enforcement candidate initiated it, the nature of the policy, i.e. if the project involves more hot spot policing, more armaments, or more police officers to the local police station. Unfortunately, there is not a dataset with that level of detail. The spending outcomes, however, partially remedies this issue as it provides an unambiguous measure of how much it is spent in public security in the municipality.

Figure 2 shows that on average the municipality increases at least R\$30 per capita per annum,²⁰ more than doubling the R\$19.4 average spending per capita in those municipalities.²¹ Although the data do not allow a fine-grained study of the policies behind these expenditures, the results make it clear that the election of law enforcement candidates influence public policy towards public security.²²

²⁰Around \$9 in May 2018.

²¹As a placebo check, Figures 14 and 13 in the Appendix uses expenditures in education and sanitation as an outcome which we should not expect law enforcement candidates to pay any particular attention. The point estimates for both stay close to zero, and confidence intervals show these estimates far from having statistical significance.

²²A qualitative analysis of elected law enforcement candidates in 2012 provides a picture of how these funds were spent. I analyzed candidates with the 20 smallest margins of victory in 2012, and that run in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (local media and municipal councils' websites may have information about legislative action, and larger municipalities are more likely to have one or both). For most (16 out of 20) incumbents it is possible to find at least one law and order policy they proposed. For example, PM Rosiney (PM stands for *polícia militar*) won a seat in the Council




Figure 2: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Public Security Spending. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

Crime Statistics

Results show that the election of law enforcement candidates reduce crime rates (Figure 3). On average, car robberies fall between 70 to 120 counts per 100,000 inhabitants on very close elections. The range of the effect and confidence intervals for theft are larger, and the effect appears less statistically significant. Figure 15 in the appendix shows there is no noticeable effect on sexual assaults.

of Lorena, state of São Paulo, and implemented a program where police officers could work overtime. Capitão Ideval, elected in Maringá, was appointed as Secretary of Traffic and Security, when he hired one hundred new officers for the municipal police (or *Guarda Municipal*). He later resigned after both his son and daughter were arrested in 2015 for involvement in crimes). Soldado Jadosn, from Mossoró, Rio Grande do Norte, secured funds for more investments in police resources, such as bulletproof vests and patrol cars. Cabo Ernesto, in Parintins, Amazonas, introduced a program where more than 400 teenagers would receive uniforms and patrol the streets.





Figure 3: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Crime Statistics. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

Violence

The election of law enforcement candidates in municipalities where these types of candidate run results in more homicides. These effects are large, consistent, and robust to different model specifications. In municipalities with a winning law enforcement candidate, and at very close elections there are around 20 - 25 more homicides on average.²³ Figure 17 plots the discontinuity around the threshold, and Figure 2 the point estimates for different study group sizes.




Figure 4: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Homicide Rates. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

The RDD intuition approximates the most to actual experiments when treatment assignment is more likely to be decided as-if randomly. That is likely to happen at very close proximity to the cutoff, where only a few votes could decide the elections. However, examining these observations close to the cutoff entails a considerable trade-off in terms of statistical power, since the number of units around small neighborhoods is likely to be small. Yet, in small study groups around the cutoff the bias should

²³The Appendix section provides other models as robustness checks: results without outliers, models with homicide rate as dependent variable (instead of difference) and the lagged outcome in the right hand side, model using triangular kernel and bias-corrected estimates.

be small, making the point estimate reliable, and it also allows for a straightforward and transparent comparison of means between treatment and control group (Dunning, 2012). Figure 5 shows the difference of means of the difference in homicide rates from the six observations closest to the cutoff, and subsequently adds the next municipality up until twenty observations. The exercise shows that the treatment effect is significant at very small margins.




Figure 5: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Homicide Rates, Very Small Margins *Point estimates are difference of means. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.*

However, is there any effect for those candidates that do not campaign on law and order? Assuming that those police candidates that do not indicate on their ballot names are not law enforcement candidates, we can compare the effects for that group against police officers that explicitly signal their occupations on the ballot.²⁴ Figure 6 shows that the effect is only evident in municipalities with winning law enforcement candidates.

²⁴I use only police officers for both groups, as they are more likely to interfere with crime and violence even if they are not law enforcement candidates (results do not change if I include military officers).




Figure 6: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Law Enforcement Signaling. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

Different groups

The following test analyzes how the violence distributes among different groups of the population. To do so, I separate victims according to the color of the skin in their death certificate. Considering that in Brazil the correlation of color of the skin and income is high (Bueno and Dunning, 2017), the procedure does not allow us to infer if heterogeneity between groups are heterogeneity across race or across class. In any case, the exercise separates group that is arguably marginalized: non-white men. Figure 7 shows that the difference between white and non-white population is stark, confirming that the election of politicians with a law-and-order agenda can result in a huge spike in violent deaths among marginalized groups. These effects do not extend to non-white women, as Figure 21 in the appendix shows. Assuming that non-white men and non-white women cohabit the same locales, the difference in effects across genders points that killings are not indiscriminate.

Police Killings and Manipulation of Statistics

The election of law enforcement candidates could spur a killing spree of police, or at least muffle police accountability. Police killings could potentially increase either




Figure 7: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Different Population Groups. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

because the LEC would induce direct killings as a way to get rid of criminals in a “a good bandit is a dead bandit” fashion, or because police officers inclined to extra-judicial killings would feel better protected to execute those perceived as criminals at will when law enforcement candidates are in power. However, the data on police killings is not completely reliable (Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima, 2014). For instance, some states have not reported any police killings over the entire period of analysis, and it is possible that law enforcement incumbents pressure or protect the local police by forcing health officials to not report deaths as police killings.

The increase in homicides does not appear to be driven by police killings. As Panel A in Figure 8 demonstrates, there is no difference between the lethality of police forces between treated and non-treated municipalities. It is worth noting that these results only include municipalities from states that have reported at least one death during the period, and including all municipalities yields null effects, too (not reported).

It is also unlikely that there is a cover-up efforts to hide police killings from official statistics. As the literature in crime statistics in Brazil shows, it is probable that officials tamper with the data (Cerqueira, 2012). It would be worrisome for the design if law enforcement councilors would somehow deflate or inflate homicide statistics. In special, they may force municipal authorities that write death certificates to rule some




Figure 8: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Police killings. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

homicides as undetermined deaths. Panel B in Figure 8 shows, however, that that is not the case.²⁵

Conclusion

This paper has shown that law and order politics can at the same time lead to a small crime reduction and a huge violence surge, especially among marginalized men. These separate trends showcase the deficiencies of recent electoral democracies. Caldeira and Holston (1999) note a disjunction in citizenship rights in new democracies: while elections bring the ability to choose rulers, they do little to bridge the gap of representation in places where inequalities are large. The election of law and order politicians not only bring this disconnect between free elections and citizenship rights to light, it also widens the separation. While some segments of society may enjoy better protection of their assets, these benefits are only achieved through the imple-

²⁵In the appendix I test if electing a law enforcement candidate affects reporting of police killings. Building a binary variable that equals one when the municipality reports a police death, we can check if there is any different pattern of reporting police killings in municipalities with a law enforcement incumbent. However there is no difference in terms of reported police killings between treatment and control (Figure 22).

mentation of policies that leaves portions of the population without proper protection from violence.

References

- Barbosa Filho, Fernando de Holanda and Samuel Pessôa. 2008. “Retorno da educação no Brasil.”
- Barr, Robert R. 2009. “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics.” *Party Politics* 15(1):29–48.
- Bateson, Regina. 2012. “Crime victimization and political participation.” *American Political Science Review* 106(3):570–587.
- Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” *The Journal of Political Economy* 76(2):169–217.
- Biderman, Ciro, João MP De Mello and Alexandre Schneider. 2010. “Dry laws and homicides: evidence from the São Paulo metropolitan area.” *The economic journal* 120(543):157–182.
- Boas, Taylor C, F Daniel Hidalgo and Neal P Richardson. 2014. “The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil.” *The Journal of Politics* 76(2):415–429.
- Braga, Anthony A, Andrew V Papachristos and David M Hureau. 2014. “The effects of hot spots policing on crime: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis.” *Justice quarterly* 31(4):633–663.
- Brasil, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos. 2018. Custos econômicos da criminalidade no Brasil. Technical report.
- Brinks, Daniel M. 2007. *The judicial response to police killings in Latin America: inequality and the rule of law*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bueno, Natalia S and Guadalupe Tuñón. 2015. “Graphical Presentation of Regression Discontinuity Results.” *Available at SSRN 2549841* .

- Bueno, Natália S and Thad Dunning. 2017. "Race, resources, and representation: evidence from Brazilian politicians." *World Politics* 69(2):327–365.
- Bueno, Samira. 2014. *Bandido bom é bandido morto: a opção ideológico-institucional da política de segurança pública na manutenção de padrões de atuação violentos da polícia militar paulista* PhD thesis.
- Bueno, Samira, Daniel Cerqueira and Renato Sérgio de Lima. 2014. "Letalidade na ação policial." *LIMA, Renato S. de; RATTON, José Luiz; AZEVEDO, Rodrigo G.(Orgs.). Crime, polícia e justiça no Brasil. São Paulo: Contexto* .
- Caldeira, Teresa PR. 2000. *City of walls: crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo*. Univ of California Press.
- Caldeira, Teresa PR and James Holston. 1999. "Democracy and violence in Brazil." *Comparative studies in society and history* 41(4):691–729.
- Calderón, Gabriela, Gustavo Robles, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni. 2015. "The beheading of criminal organizations and the dynamics of violence in Mexico." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8):1455–1485.
- Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D Cattaneo and Rocio Titiunik. 2014. "Robust non-parametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs." *Econometrica* 82(6):2295–2326.
- Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2015. "Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):1–18.
- Cattaneo, Matias D, Michael Jansson and Xinwei Ma. 2017. Simple local polynomial density estimators. Technical report Working Paper. Retrieved July 22, 2017 from http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~cattaneo/papers/Cattaneo-Jansson-Ma_2017_LocPolDensity.pdf.
- Cepaluni, Gabriel and Umberto Mignozzetti. 2015. "Politicians matter: Legislature size and welfare with evidence from brazil."
- Cerqueira, Daniel. 2012. "Mortes violentas não esclarecidas e impunidade no Rio de Janeiro." *Economia aplicada* 16(2):201–235.

- Dell, Melissa. 2015. "Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war." *American Economic Review* 105(6):1738–79.
- Di Tella, Rafael and Ernesto Schargrotsky. 2004. "Do police reduce crime? Estimates using the allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack." *American Economic Review* 94(1):115–133.
- Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 2002. "Inequality and violent crime." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 45(1):1–39.
- Flom, Hernan. 2018. "Controlling bureaucracies in weak institutional contexts: the politics of police autonomy."
- Flom, Hernán and Alison E Post. 2016. "Blame Avoidance and Policy Stability in Developing Democracies: The Politics of Public Security in Buenos Aires." *Comparative Politics* 49(1):23–46.
- Gambetta, Diego. 1996. *The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection*. Harvard University Press.
- García-Ponce, Omar, Lauren Young and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2018. "Anger and support for punitive justice in Mexico's drug war."
- Gerber, Alan S and Donald P Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. WW Norton.
- Gonzalez, Yanilda Maria. 2014. *State Building on the Ground: Police Reform and Participatory Security in Latin America* PhD thesis Princeton University.
- Gould, Eric D, Bruce A Weinberg and David B Mustard. 2002. "Crime rates and local labor market opportunities in the United States: 1979–1997." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 84(1):45–61.
- Harcourt, Bernard E. 2009. *Illusion of order: The false promise of broken windows policing*. Harvard University Press.

- Hicken, Allen and Erik Martinez Kuhonta. 2011. "Shadows from the past: Party system institutionalization in Asia." *Comparative Political Studies* pp. 572–597.
- Hinton, Mercedes S and Tim Newburn. 2008. *Policing developing democracies*. Routledge.
- Holland, Alisha C. 2013. "Right on Crime?: Conservative Party Politics and Mano Dura Policies in El Salvador." *Latin American Research Review* 48(1):44–67.
- Huggins, Martha Knisely. 1991. *Vigilantism and the state in modern Latin America: essays on extralegal violence*. Praeger New York.
- Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2012. "Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression discontinuity estimator." *The Review of economic studies* 79(3):933–959.
- IPEA, E FBSP. 2018. "Atlas da Violência 2017."
- Keele, Luke and Nathan J Kelly. 2005. "Dynamic models for dynamic theories: The ins and outs of lagged dependent variables." *Political analysis* 14(2):186–205.
- Kerbauy, Maria Teresa Miceli. 2005. "As câmaras municipais brasileiras: perfil de carreira e percepção sobre o processo decisório local." *Opinião Pública* 11(2):337–365.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2010. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lacey, Nicola and David Soskice. 2015. "Crime, punishment and segregation in the United States: The paradox of local democracy." *Punishment & Society* 17(4):454–481.
- Lee, David S and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. "Regression discontinuity designs in economics." *The Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2):281–355.
- Lessing, Benjamin. 2017. *Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck and Jorge I Domínguez. 2016. *Challenges of party-building in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

- Levitsky, Steven and Maxwell A Cameron. 2003. "Democracy without parties? Political parties and regime change in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45(3):1–33.
- Lochner, Lance and Enrico Moretti. 2004. "The effect of education on crime: Evidence from prison inmates, arrests, and self-reports." *American economic review* 94(1):155–189.
- Lopez, Felix and Acir Almeida. 2017. "Legisladores, captadores e assistencialistas: a representação política no nível local." *Revista de Sociologia e Política* 25(62).
- Magaloni, Beatriz, Edgar Franco and Vanessa Melo. 2015. Killing in the Slums: An Impact Evaluation of Police Reform in Rio de Janeiro. Technical report CDDRL Working Paper 556, Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.
- Marshall, John. 2018. "Political information cycles: When do voters sanction incumbent parties for high homicide rates?".
- Moncada, Eduardo. 2013. "The politics of urban violence: Challenges for development in the Global South." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48(3):217–239.
- Novaes, Lucas M. 2018. "Disloyal brokers and weak parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1):84–98.
- Phillips, Brian J. 2015. "How does leadership decapitation affect violence? The case of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico." *The Journal of Politics* 77(2):324–336.
- Poertner, Mathias. 2018. Creating partisans: the organizational roots of new parties in Latin America PhD thesis University of California, Berkeley.
- Post, Alison E. 2018. "Cities and Politics in the Developing World." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21:115–133.
- Raphael, Steven and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer. 2001. "Identifying the effect of unemployment on crime." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 44(1):259–283.
- Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 2006. "Death squads and democracy in Northeast Brazil." *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony* pp. 150–87.

- Silva, Patrick Cunha. 2014. O poder legislativo municipal: estrutura, composição e produção PhD thesis Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política)–Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
- Soares, Rodrigo R and Igor Viveiros. 2017. “Organization and Information in the Fight against Crime: The Integration of Police Forces in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil.” *Economía* 17(2):29–63.
- Soares, Rodrigo R and Joana Naritomi. 2010. Understanding high crime rates in Latin America: The role of social and policy factors. In *The economics of crime: Lessons for and from Latin America*. University of Chicago Press pp. 19–55.
- Staats, Joseph L, Shaun Bowler and Jonathan T Hiskey. 2005. “Measuring judicial performance in Latin America.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 47(4):77–106.
- Stokes, Susan C, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. 2006. *Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- Willis, Graham Denyer. 2014. “Antagonistic authorities and the civil police in São Paulo, Brazil.” *Latin American Research Review* 49(1):3–22.
- Willis, Graham Denyer. 2015. *The killing consensus: police, organized crime, and the regulation of life and death in urban Brazil*. Univ of California Press.

A Appendix

A.1 Summary statistics

Table 2: Summary Statistics

	mean	sd	min	max
Margin	-0.013	0.014	-0.101	0.085
Votes	380.544	1362.082	0.000	89053.000
Elected	0.103	0.304	0.000	1.000
Female	0.034	0.180	0.000	1.000
Age	46.528	8.912	19.000	85.000
Leftwing party	0.210	0.407	0.000	1.000
Donors	3.597	5.182	1.000	115.000
Donations	15.789	50.117	0.002	1168.821
Brokers	3.306	14.773	0.000	444.000
Wealth	315.333	4529.394	0.000	156272.000
Diff. Homicide Rate	2.120	12.716	-109.850	82.784
Homicide Rate	20.611	18.599	0.000	130.410
Past Homicide Rate	19.133	18.378	0.000	130.410
Homicide Rate, Nonwhite Pop	4.165	17.772	-160.707	122.624
Diff. Homicide Rate, Nonwhite	24.746	24.667	0.000	163.910
Police Killings	0.071	0.380	0.000	9.647
Suicide Rate	5.130	4.691	0.000	86.046
Undetermined Rate	4.290	6.916	0.000	149.028
Car Robbery Rate	47.116	80.531	0.000	795.373
Sexual Assault Rate	15.845	19.502	0.000	477.066
Theft Rate	82.074	100.008	0.000	867.186
Nonwhite Pop	0.496	0.224	0.004	0.968
Gini	0.555	0.064	0.336	0.880
Security Spending (p.c.)	43.740	103.005	0.000	1576.275

Note: Includes law enforcement candidates and municipalities where law enforcement candidates have run for municipal council. Rates are values for the period, divided by the population and the number of years of the period, times 100,000 a year. Hence, Homicide Rate, for example, is the total homicides for four years of the electoral cycle, divided by the average population and for the number of years (four), times 100,000.

Table 3: Comparing municipalities that had and had not a law enforcement candidate (LEC), 2012

variable	With LEC	Without LEC
Non-White Population	0.55	0.51
Population	87243.94	14881.25
Inequality (GINI)	0.52	0.50
(Past) Homicides per 100,000	22.12	12.63
(Past) Non-White Men Homicides per 100,000	46.37	23.92
(Past) Public Security Spending, in Reais pc	6.34	2.70
Car Robberies pc	40.86	20.94

Note: Yearly rates. All differences between the two groups are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ levels. In the 2012 elections, there were 1442 municipalities with law enforcement candidates (out of 5560 municipalities).

B Law Enforcement Candidates' Campaigns

In order to better compare competitive law enforcement candidates with others, I separate competitive candidates that won or lost elections by margins smaller than 0.25% of the valid votes. The analysis show that law enforcement candidates do not rely as much on outside help during campaigns, receiving roughly half of the average amount of donations, and declaring six instead of eight campaign donors on average (Panels B and D in Figure 9). In addition, records show that law enforcement candidates are less wealthy. These campaign numbers indicate that competitive law enforcement candidates must run a different campaign from the ordinary candidate.

If that is the case, they will not need to rely as much on clientelism as the average candidate. It is not possible to illustrate accurately clientelistic transactions, but since clientelistic mobilization requires agents to enforce the contingent exchange of goods for votes (Stokes et al., 2013), using campaign records we can have a tentative picture of this team of brokers in council elections by identifying payments candidates make to individuals perform some task related to the campaign. In this way, we an approximation of the clientelistic network of each candidate. Not all payments to individuals in campaigns are destined to brokers, and not all brokers receive compensation by legal means, but the descriptions of campaign expenditures show that some transactions are used to reward mobilization efforts. Assuming that all individuals that receive money during a councilor's campaign are brokers certainly returns a higher number of agents, since some individuals rent their cars for candidates' use, or do clerical tasks during the campaign. However, since these other individuals that do not act as brokers are likely to be present on all campaigns, and the hypothesis is that law enforcement agents have less foot soldiers than other candidates, the measurement error will inflate the number of brokers mainly for those candidates that do not engage in clientelism. Still, as Figure 9 Panel C shows, the number of brokers law enforcement candidates use is less than half of what the average candidate's.




Figure 9: Campaign resources for competitive candidates. *Includes candidates that won or lost the election by a margin equal or smaller than 0.25% in the 2012 and 2016 elections. Averages of 264 law enforcement candidates, and 6990 other candidates that competed in municipalities where there was a competitive law enforcement candidate. Bars are standard errors.*

Law and order candidates are relatively outsiders, making them inexperienced in terms of politics and policymaking, and giving them only limited sanctioning from political peers. This “outsideness” heightens the uncertainty about the scope and results of the policies law enforcement candidates enact. Although politicians are not particularly attached to political parties in Brazil, law enforcement candidates appear to be even more detached. Barr (2009) conceptualizes outsiders in politics as those politicians whose prominence comes not from established parties, but either from fringe political parties or from external organizations. Figure 10 compares the political experience of law enforcement candidates and regular politicians in two related dimensions. First, Panel A calculates the average tenure of each group of candidates according to the number of years they have been member of the party in which they run for an election. However, given the fluidity of party membership in Brazil, that membership does not capture the candidates’ entry in party politics. The second dimension (Panel B) aims at capturing this overall political experience, i.e. the total number of years in which candidates have been members of any political party. The comparison shows a considerable difference in political experience between groups, with law enforcement candidates having only 2.6 years of party membership before running an election, and 7.5 years of party membership, revealing that law enforcement candidates are relatively outsiders in elections.




Figure 10: Length of party membership for competitive candidates. *Includes candidates that won or lost the election by a margin equal or smaller than 0.25% in the 2016 elections. Averages of 98 law enforcement candidates, and 1150 other candidates that competed in municipalities where there was a competitive law enforcement candidate. Bars are standard errors.*

Classifying Law Enforcement Candidates and Candidates' Professional Background

I classify council candidates as law enforcement candidates if their ballot names have one of the following terms (including gender and spelling variations, and abbreviations): soldado, cabo, sargento, tenente, major, coronel, general, comandante, delegado, capitão, policial, civil, investigador, inspetor, sub-tenente, pm, xerife. Some police officers, especially *delegados*, are commonly given a “doutor” deference. For this reason, I classify as law enforcement candidates those candidates who put a doutor in their ballot name, and at the same declare to be police officers as an occupation.

Candidates' occupation information comes from their self-reported answer to the electoral's authority questionnaire prior to every election. I classify a candidate's professional background as police officer if the occupation she listed is polícia civil, polícia militar, or delegado de polícia. Armed forces candidates are militar em geral, militar reformado, oficiais das forças armadas e forças auxiliares, membro das forças armadas.

B.1 Density test

The density test of the running variable is important to the regression discontinuity design because it informs us if there has been any potential manipulation around the cutoff. If such is the case, the potential outcomes framework would break apart, as treatment assignment would be compromised by unknown factors that could be associated to the selection of treatment and control. In our case, the running variable for the regression discontinuity design is the distance between the candidate and the last winner of the candidate's list, if that candidate lost the election, or the distance to the first loser of the list, when the candidate won the election. Manipulation would happen if close winning or close losing candidates would in fact agglomerate on one side or another for some reason. As the test below shows, however, there is no indication of sorting around the zero margin threshold (0 at the x-axis).




Figure 11: Density test. *Nonparametric density test around the RDD cutoff, following Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017)*

B.2 Balance tests




Figure 12: Balance tests. *Darker dots represent tests whose difference between treatment and control is significant at 10% level.*

B.3 Placebo Test for Public Security Spending

The idea behind the tests in Figures 13 and 14 is to check if the election of a law enforcement candidate alters the spending in areas outside the expertise of those candidates. Although the tests in the main text show that the election of law enforcement candidates generates more spending in public security and given that policymakers work under a constrained budget, it is unlikely that that increase would result in noticeable fewer spending in specific areas. That is, since there are many areas in the municipal budget, it is also improbable that the increase in public security would generate a significant crowd-out in any sanitation or education alone. Tests confirm that law enforcement candidates do not have any special appreciation in public sanitation or education, as there is no noticeable effect in spending in these areas.




Figure 13: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Sanitation Expenditures. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*




Figure 14: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Education Expenditures. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

B.4 Results for Sexual Assault

The Ministry of Justice data on crime also includes sexual assault at the municipality level. Below is the test for that outcome, which does not present a significant effect. The point estimates are usually close to zero, which indicates that the lack of noticeable effect is not due to low statistical power.




Figure 15: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Sexual Assault Rates. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

B.5 Placebo for Homicide Rate

The estimations in Figure 16 show the effect of electing a law enforcement candidate on the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the effect on the difference in homicide rates between the period before the election and the period before that. At close races, there is no indication that election of candidates explain past outcomes, attesting for the validity of the design.






Figure 16: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate. *Local linear models.* Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.


B.6 Graphical Representation of the Discontinuity and Alternative Specifications




(a) Local linear



(b) Second degree polynomial



(c) Third degree polynomial



(d) Forth degree polynomial

Figure 17: Discontinuity Plots for Homicide Rates

Alternate Specifications

Figure 18 shows the estimations using bias-corrected models.




Figure 18: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate. *Local linear models with bias-corrected estimates and year dummies, using Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), triangular kernel. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

Estimations in Figure 19 do not include observations whose outcome lies outside the range of two absolute standard deviation from the median outcome.

Estimations in Figure 20 have *homicides per capita* in the period after the election as dependent variable, and include the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of the equation.




Figure 19: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Without Outliers. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*




Figure 20: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Level of Homicide Rate as DV. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

B.7 Homicides Among Non-White Women




Figure 21: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate, Non-White Women. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*

B.8 Reporting

It is possible that law enforcement incumbents influence the reporting of “autos de resistência”, or police killings. In Figure 22 I test and rule out that hypothesis using a binary outcome that tells if the municipality reported any homicide by the police after the election.




Figure 22: The Effect of Electing a Law Enforcement Candidate on Police Killing Reporting. *Local linear models. Bars represent 95% robust confidence intervals.*